Time and power allocation for the Gaussian wiretap channel with feedback of secret keys by Vía Rodríguez, Javier
Time and Power Allocation for the Gaussian
Wiretap Channel with Feedback of Secret Keys
Javier Vı́a
University of Cantabria. Spain
jvia@gtas.dicom.unican.es
Abstract—This paper solves the time and power allocation
problem for the simplest feedback scheme for the Gaussian
wiretap channel, which is based on the transmission of random
secret keys to be used in a one time pad manner. Specifically, the
optimal transmission powers at Alice and Bob, as well as the time
sharing factor between the feedback and feedforward channels,
are given by the solution of a non-convex optimization problem,
which is found by means of the golden section algorithm and
the sequential solution of several convex optimization problems.
Additionally, an specific and highly efficient procedure for the
solution of the inner convex optimization problems is provided,
which avoids the need for general purpose optimization packages.
Finally, several simulation results illustrate the potential secrecy
gains achievable with a feedback scheme as simple as the one
considered in this paper.
Keywords—Physical Layer Secrecy, Wiretap Channel, One-Time
Pad, Feedback, Resource Allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last years, physical layer security [1], [2] has
received increasing interest of the information theory, signal
processing, and communications communities, which has al-
ready provided many important results [3]–[5]. As an example,
one of the fundamental and best understood problems in phys-
ical layer security consists in the classical wiretap channel [3],
in which an eavesdropper (Eve) aims at intercepting a secret
communication between two legitimate parties, the transmitter
(Alice) and the receiver (Bob). However, the practical case in
which feedback is allowed still presents several difficulties, and
only partial information-theoretic results are available [6]–[8].
On the other hand, although the signal processing community
has generated many interesting works on the wiretap channel,
specially focusing on the case of multiantenna nodes [9]–
[11], the gains offered by simple feedback schemes have been
underexplored [12], [13].
This paper focuses on the two-way Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel with single-antenna nodes, and in a very simple feedback
scheme based on the transmission of random secret keys by
means of Wyner coding. Specifically, the secret random keys
are transmitted over the feedback wiretap channel at a rate
not higher than its secrecy capacity. Thus, these secret keys
are later used to protect, by means of the one time pad
[14], the otherwise insecure messages in the forward wiretap
channel [6]. Despite its simplicity, this feedback scheme raises
a far from trivial question related to the optimal time and
power allocation. In particular, we address the problem of
finding the optimal time sharing factor and power allocation
between Alice and Bob with the goal of maximizing the overall
secrecy rate. As will be seen, the non-convex time and power
Fig. 1. Wiretap channel with feedback.
allocation problem can be solved by means of the golden
section algorithm [15] and a sequence of convex optimization
problems, which admit a simple solution based on a specific
algorithm, thus avoiding the use of general purpose numerical
optimization packages [16].
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a wiretap channel [1], [3] as the one illustrated
in Fig. 1, with two legitimate single-antenna nodes Alice and
Bob, and one single-antenna eavesdropper Eve. When Alice
transmits, the signals received by Bob and Eve can be written
as
xB = hABsA + nB, xAE = hAEsA + nAE, (1)
where nB and nAE are independent circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance, sA is
the signal transmitted by Alice, and hAB and hAE represent
the complex channel from Alice, to Bob and Eve respectively.
Analogously, the received signals in the feedback channel
(from Bob to Alice) are
xA = hBAsB + nA, xBE = hBEsB + nBE, (2)
with similar definitions for hBA, hBE, nA, nBE and sB.
This paper addresses the problem of transmitting secret
information from Alice to Bob, and is well known that when
feedback is not allowed, Alice can transmit secret information
at a rate [1]
RSAB = [C(gABPA)− C(gAEPA)]+ , (3)
where [·]+ = max (·, 0), gAB = |hAB|2, gAE = |hAE|2, PA is
the transmission power, and C(p) = log(1 + p) is the clas-
sical Shannon’s capacity. Moreover, Alice can simultaneously
transmit a stream of public data, with no guaranteed secrecy,
at a rate [6]
RPAB = C(gABPA)−RSAB. (4)
Fig. 2. Proposed secret-key based feedback scheme. During the first stage,
Bob sends a secret random message to Alice. In the second stage, this
information is used as a secret key in order to protect the message transmitted
in an insecure manner.
A. Proposed Scheme
What this paper proposes is a very simple feedback scheme
for improving the secrecy rate, which is illustrated in Fig. 2. In
particular, the proposed scheme divides the transmission time
into the following two stages:
• Stage I: During the first stage, which takes a fraction
α of the transmission time, Bob transmits (with power
PB) random secret information to Alice at a rate
RSBA = [C(gBAPB)− C(gBEPB)]+.
• Stage II: During the remaining fraction (1 − α) of
time, Alice transmits secret information at a rate RSAB
as well as key-protected public information with rate
RKAB. That is, the secret information transmitted by
Bob is used in the second stage as a shared key to
protect, by means of the one-time pad [14], the oth-
erwise insecure transmission over the public channel.
With the previous description, it is clear that the overall secrecy
rate is
R
S
AB = (1− α)
(
RSAB +R
K
AB
)
, (5)
and obviously, the secret key protected rate is bounded by
(1− α)RKAB ≤ min
(
(1− α)RPAB, αRSBA
)
. (6)
That is, the number of secret key protected bits can not
exceed the number of key bits, nor the number of bits in the
public stream. Finally, we must point out that the proposed
scheme can be seen as an adaptation of the technique proposed
in [6] for the case of wiretap channels with secure rate-
limited feedback. Moreover, although the technique in [6] is
information theoretically optimal in the case with secure rate-
limited feedback, it is clearly suboptimal in the general setting
of wiretap channels with feedback [7], [8], [13]. Therefore,
the proposed technique, which from a coding point of view
allows us to consider the forward and backward links in an
independent manner, can be considered as a benchmark for
more sophisticated feedback schemes.
B. Optimization Problem
Considering peak, average and total power constraints, the
resource (powers and time sharing factor α) allocation problem
to be solved can be written as
maximize
PA,PB,α,RKAB
(1− α)RSAB(gABPA, gAEPA) + (1− α)RKAB
subject to (1− α)RKAB ≤ αRSBA(gBAPB, gBEPB),
RKAB ≤ RPAB(gABPA, gAEPA),
0 ≤ PA ≤ P PA,
0 ≤ PB ≤ P PB ,
(1− α)PA ≤ PAvA ,
αPB ≤ PAvB ,
αPB + (1− α)PA ≤ P T,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
(7)
where the dependence of the rates with the powers and channel
gains has been made explicit, and where P PA, P
P
B , P
Av
A , P
Av
B and
P T represent the peak, average and total power constraints,
which are fixed parameters.
Despite the non-convexity of problem (7), we will see that
it can be efficiently solved by means of the algorithm presented
in the next section. However, before presenting the solution of
the resource allocation problem, we need to point out some
important facts.
Remark 1: It is easy to see that one of the global solutions
of (7) satisfies (1 − α)RKAB = αRSBA and accordingly R
S
AB =
(1 − α)RSAB + αRSBA. That is, all the secret key bits will be
used in the second stage. This can be directly corroborated by
noting that, given a solution of (7) with (1−α)RKAB < αRSBA,
one can decrease PB without modifying the objective function
nor violating the constraints until (1− α)RKAB = αRSBA. From
now on, we will focus on this particular solution (that with the
lowest PB), which allows us to rewrite (7) as
maximize
PA,PB,α
(1− α)RSAB + αRSBA
subject to αRSBA ≤ (1− α)RPAB,
0 ≤ PA ≤ P PA,
0 ≤ PB ≤ P PB ,
(1− α)PA ≤ PAvA ,
αPB ≤ PAvB ,
αPB + (1− α)PA ≤ P T,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
(8)
where, for notational simplicity, we have omitted the depen-
dence of the different rates with the transmission powers.
Remark 2: Since all the rate functions RSBA, R
S
AB, R
P
AB are
concave on the powers PA, PB, time sharing does not offer any
advantage. That is, it does not make sense to alternate between
two (or more) implementations of the proposed scheme with
different values of the parameters PA, PB, α.
Remark 3: The case with RSBA = 0 (gBA ≤ gBE) results in
the trivial solution α = 0. Therefore, we can consider without
loss of generality gBA > gBE.
Remark 4: In the case with RSAB = 0 (gAB ≤ gAE) we
have αRSBA = (1 − α)RPAB = (1 − α)C(gABPA). Moreover,
this case can be treated without loss of generality by assuming
gAE = gAB. Thus, from now on we will assume gAE ≤ gAB.
Remark 5: Finally, it is important to note that, in general,
the solution of (8) does not necessarily satisfies αRSBA = (1−
α)RPAB (see the example in Fig. 3). Analogously, it is not true
that α = 0 or RSBA > R
S
AB at the solution. These conditions
are only satisfied in some particular scenarios, two of which
deserve special attention.
1) Scenario 1: Only Peak Power Constraints: In the case
with only peak power constraints, the secret and public
rates do not depend on α, which makes easy to prove that,
if1 RSBA(gBAP
P
B , gBEP
P
B) > R
S
AB(gABP
P
A, gAEP
P
A), the solution
must satisfy PA = P PA, PB = P
P
B and
αRSBA = (1− α)RPAB, (9)
which yields
α =
RPAB
RPAB +R
S
BA
, (10)
and
R
S
AB = R
S
AB +R
P
AB
RSBA −RSAB
RSBA +R
P
AB
, (11)
or equivalently
R
S
AB = C(gABP
P
A)
[
RSBA
RSBA +R
P
AB
]
. (12)
Thus, the second term in the right hand side of (11) can be seen
as the secrecy rate gain provided by the use of the proposed
feedback scheme, whereas the term in brackets in (12) can be
interpreted as the penalization on the (conventional) channel
capacity due to the presence of an eavesdropper.
2) Scenario 2: Reciprocal Channels with Only a Total
Power Constraint: The same conclusion can be reached in
the case with reciprocal channels (gAB = gBA) and only a
total power constraint. Basically, the fact of having reciprocal
channels implies the monotonicity (with P ) of
RSBA(gBAP, gBEP )−RSAB(gABP, gBEP ). (13)
In other words, one of the two links (forward or backward)
provides a higher secrecy rate than the other for any power
level P . Thus, we can easily conclude that, for gBE ≤ gAE, the
global solution satisfies2
α =
RPAB
RPAB +R
S
BA
, (14)
and
R
S
AB = R
S
AB +R
P
AB
RSBA −RSAB
RSBA +R
P
AB
= C(gABPA)
[
RSBA
RSBA +R
P
AB
]
.
(15)
1The case with RSBA(gBAP
P
B , gBEP
P
B ) ≤ R
S
AB(gABP
P
A, gAEP
P
A) results in
the trivial solution α = PB = 0, PA = P PA
2Note that unlike the case with only peak power constraints, eqs. (14) and
(15) are based on rates depending on the final power allocation. Note also
that the trivial case with gBE ≥ gAE, or equivalently RSBA(gBAP, gBEP ) ≤
RSAB(gABP, gAEP ), again results in α = 0 and PA = P
T.
Algorithm 1 Golden Section Algorithm for the solution of the
time and power allocation problem.
Input: Channel gains gAB, gBA, gAE, gBE, power constraints
P PA, P
P
B , P
Av
A , P
Av
B , P
T, and precision γ.
Output: Optimal time sharing factor α and powers PA, PB.
Initialize: φ = 1 + 1−
√
5
2 , and M =
log γ
log(1−φ) .
Evaluate (by solving (17)) RSAB(α) at αmin = 0, α1 = φ,
α2 = 1− φ, and αmax = 1.
for t = 1, . . . ,M do
if the maximum evaluated RSAB(α) is at α2 or αmax then
Set αmin = α1, and update α1 = α2.
Update α2 = φαmin + (1− φ)αmax.
else
Set αmax = α2, and update α2 = α1.
Update α1 = (1− φ)αmin + φαmax.
end if
Evaluate RSAB(α) at the new evaluation point, and obtain
PA and PB by solving (17).
end for
III. SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL TIME AND POWER
ALLOCATION PROBLEM
This section presents the general solution to problem (8).
In particular, let us start by noting that, although (7) is not
jointly convex on PA, PB, α,RKAB, it is convex on PA, PB, R
K
AB
for a fixed α. Therefore, problem (7) can be reformulated as
maximize
α
R
S
AB(α)
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
(16)
where R
S
AB(α) is the optimal value of the convex optimization
problem
maximize
PA,PB,RKAB
(1− α)RSAB(gABPA, gAEPA) + (1− α)RKAB
subject to (1− α)RKAB ≤ αRSBA(gBAPB, gBEPB),
RKAB ≤ RPAB(gABPA, gAEPA),
0 ≤ PA ≤ P̄A,
0 ≤ PB ≤ P̄B,
αPB + (1− α)PA ≤ P T,
(17)
with P̄A = min (P PA, P
Av
A /(1− α)) and P̄B =
min (P PB , P
Av
B /α). Furthermore, taking into account the
second remark in Subsection II-B, and invoking standard
convexity results, it is easy to show that R
S
AB(α) is concave
in α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the solution of (16) can be obtained
by means of the Golden Section Algorithm [15], which is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
A. Solution for Fixed α (Inner Optimization Problem)
As previously pointed out, problem (17) is convex, and
can be solved by standard convex optimization tools [16],
[17]. However, further insight can be obtained by carefully
analyzing the optimization problem. In particular, taking into
account the first remark in Subsection II-B, we can rewrite
Fig. 3. Geometrical interpretation for the solution of problem (18). Dashed lines represents each one of the four constraints and the objective function is
nondecreasing and concave in PA and PB. Left: When point C is to the left of point A, C is the solution. Center: When point C is in the segment AB, the
solution belongs to the segment AC. Right: If C is below B, the solution belongs to segment AB. Note that in this last scenario, the solution does not satisfy
αRSBA = (1− α)R
P
AB.
(17) as
maximize
PA,PB
(1− α)RSAB + αRSBA
subject to αRSBA ≤ (1− α)RPAB,
0 ≤ PA ≤ P̄A,
0 ≤ PB ≤ P̄B,
αPB + (1− α)PA ≤ P T.
(18)
Fortunately, problem (18) admits a simple geometrical in-
terpretation, which is illustrated in Figure 3 and allows us
to solve the optimization problem in a very simple manner.
In particular, taking into account that the objective function
is nondecreasing and concave in PA and PB, the problem
practically reduces to find the set of active constraints, which
can be easily done by means of the following steps:
1) Let us start by checking whether the first two con-
straints are active. In order to do so, we just need
to set PA = P̄A and PB =
P T−(1−α)P̄A
α , which is
represented by point A in Fig. 3, and check whether
αRSBA ≥ (1− α)RPAB, i.e.
(1− α) log(1 + gAEPA) ≤ α log
(
1 + gBAPB
1 + gBEPB
)
.
(19)
If the previous condition is satisfied, the two first
constraints of (18) are active at the solution (point
C in Fig. 3), which is given by
PA = P̄A, PB =
x− 1
gBA − gBEx
, (20)
with x = (1 + gAEP̄A)(α
−1−1).
2) If condition (19) is not satisfied, the total power
constraint is active at the solution. Therefore, PB can
be rewritten as PB =
P T−(1−α)PA
α , which reduces (18)
to the following one-dimensional convex optimization
problem
maximize
PA
(1− α)RSAB(PA) + αRSBA(PA)
subject to P̃A ≤ PA ≤ P̄A,
(21)
where the dependence of the objective function with
PA has been pointed out, and where P̃A (which
establishes the lower-right extreme of the red segment
in Fig. 3) is the minimum value of PA satisfying
the first and third constraints in (18). Obviously, the
previous problem can be easily solved, for instance,
by means of bisection on the derivative of the concave
objective function.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, some numerical results illustrate the per-
formance of the proposed key-based feedback scheme for
secrecy. All the results are based on the averaged secrecy rates
obtained from 105 independent simulations of a scenario with
reciprocal standard Rayleigh channels (hAB = hBA), and where
the eavesdropper channels are independent Rayleigh channels
with variances βφ for hAE and β(1−φ) for hBE. In this manner,
parameter β controls the average quality of the eavesdropper
channels, whereas φ controls the relative quality between the
wiretap channel to Alice and Bob, i.e., a value of φ close
to zero can represent a scenario with an eavesdropper much
closer to Bob, whereas φ ' 1 represents a scenario with an
eavesdropper closer to Alice. The power constraint parameters
have been defined as P PA = P
P
B = 2P
T, PAvA = P
Av
B = 0.7P
T,
and P T is used to control the overall SNR.
The first experiment evaluates the averaged secrecy rate
for β = 0.5 and different SNRs and φ values. The results are
shown in Fig. 4, where we can see that, excluding the case
in which the eavesdropper channel to Bob is very good, the
use of feedback provides a significative gain in the averaged
secrecy rates. As expected, the gap between the schemes with
and without feedback increases with φ.
The second experiment evaluates the averaged secrecy rate
for a constant φ = 0.5 and different values of the overall
eavesdropper channel quality factor β. As can be seen in Fig.
5, the feedback based scheme clearly provides an important
increase of the averaged secrecy rates for different values of
β.
Finally, the impact of the parameter φ is again illustrated
in Fig. 6, where we can see that the worst value of φ for the
feedback scheme is around 0.5, whereas the worst performance
of the scheme without feedback is obtained for φ = 1.
In a practical setting with feedback, this suggests that an
SNR (dB)
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
ec
re
cy
 R
at
e
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
β=0.5
φ=0.1
φ=0.5
φ=0.9
With Feedback
Without Feedback
Fig. 4. Averaged secrecy rates for β = 0.5 and different values of φ.
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Fig. 5. Averaged secrecy rates for φ = 0.5 and different values of β.
eavesdropper can not gain anything by getting closer to the
information transmitting node.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In a wiretap channel with feedback, a simple and practical
feedback scheme is based on the preliminary transmission
of a secret key, to be used in a one time pad manner
for the transmission of secret information. This paper has
addressed the problem of time and power allocation in a
general single antenna scenario with peak, average, and total
power constraints. The solution of the non-convex optimiza-
tion problem can be efficiently found by solving a sequence
of convex optimization problems and applying the Golden
Section algorithm. Furthermore, a specific algorithm for the
inner convex optimization problem is presented, and several
simulation results illustrate the secrecy gains achievable with
a feedback scheme as simple as the one proposed in this paper.
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